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The recent passage and subsequent repeal of the Medicare Cata-
strophic Coverage Act highlights the importance of the private supple-
mental health insurance market. One of the primary reasons why the
legislation was repealed was that most consumers already had coverage
for many of the benefits through their "Medigap" policies. The legisla-
tion's repeal means that most of the elderly will continue to rely on
these policies for protection against the costs associated with acute
illnesses.
In this article, we examine the quality of beneficiary choices for
supplemental health insurance using data from a survey of Medicare
beneficiaries in six states. As part of this study, we were able to collect
actual copies of policies owned by those in the sample, which allowed
us to assess the type and extent of coverage offered. We use logic
analysis to determine which types of individuals appear to be making
the most effective choices about private insurance. Such information
should be particularly useful given the increasing interest in the supple-
mental health insurance market.
BACKGROUND
Elderly persons can purchase several types of policies to supplement
their Medicare benefits. The most common type is referred to as a
"Medigap" policy. These policies provide coverage largely for the
deductibles and coinsurance associated with hospital and physician
services. Other insurance products exist as well. One of the most com-
mon is "hospital indemnity" coverage. This type of policy pays a fixed
amount per day when the policyholder is hospitalized. Another type,
referred to as "dread disease" policies, provides coverage for policy-
holders only if they have cancer or other diseases specified in the policy.
Other types of policies include major medical coverage provided by
employers to currently employed Medicare beneficiaries, and policies
that cover only specific services (long-term care, pharmacy, etc.). It has
been estimated that the size of the entire private market for health
insurance was about $13 billion during 1986, nearly $500 per elderly
person in the United States (Rice 1987).
Employer-sponsored policies have become particularly important
in recent years. As of 1987, 45 percent of retirees with private health
insurance coverage listed a former employer as the source (Monheit
and Schur 1989). These policies tend to mimic the benefit structure
offered to current employees. For example, whereas few individually
purchased supplemental insurance plans cover prescription drugs, over
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90 percent of those offered by employers provide such coverage
(DiCarlo et al. 1989).
Historically, there was federal concern over state regulation of
Medicare supplemental insurance due to the complicated nature of this
coverage-but also because of the possible vulnerability of the pur-
chaser population. Traditionally, state insurance regulators were more
concerned with preventing insurance company insolvency than with
addressing consumer complaints, monitoring advertising irregulari-
ties, providing consumer education, or reviewing premiums. Conse-
quently, many federal policymakers believed that the states should take
further steps to ensure that such policies were marketed fairly and that
policies met certain standards. Subsequently, a set of model standards
for supplemental insurance policies was developed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These standards
include coverage for all inpatient hospital coinsurance for stays in
excess of 60 days; coverage of 90 percent of costs for stays lasting up to
one year beyond the date that Medicare benefits are exhausted; cover-
age of physician services in both inpatient and outpatient settings; and
payment of the 20 percent coinsurance on "reasonable" physician
charges, with a maximum deductible of $200 per year and a minimum
total benefit of $5,000.1 States were encouraged to enact these stan-
dards as part of the 1980 Social Security Amendments (known as the
Baucus legislation after its senate sponsor). Forty-six states have passed
legislation that meets the NAIC standard. The other four (Massachu-
setts, New York, Rhode Island, and Wyoming) have established
requirements of their own (Department of Health and Human Services
1987).
These NAIC model regulations apply only to policies purchased
individually and only to policies wishing to call themselves "Medicare
supplements." Thus, several types of policies commonly held by those
over 65 are excluded. First, those provided directly by employers and
those provided originally through employers but converted to individ-
ual policies on retirement (so-called "conversion" policies) are not sub-
ject to the legislation. Furthermore, hospital indemnity and
dread-disease policies are also excluded as long as they make no claim
to be "Medicare supplements." Finally, policies sold before the enact-
ment of the legislation are also excluded.
In earlier research using the same survey data as employed in this
article, we found that the establishment of minimum benefit standards
resulted in the purchase of better policies by the elderly (McCall, Rice,
and Hall 1987). On the basis of these results, the Department of Health
and Human Services (1987) has urged states to extend Baucus-like
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NAIC model standards to those policies currently not subject to the
legislation.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The previous research of relevance to this study concerns the factors
that have affected the choice of supplemental health insurance policies
by the elderly. A number of studies have examined characteristics of
beneficiaries who do and do not have coverage. Much less information
is available concerning the particular characteristics of coverage
purchased.
With regard to the first of these issues-who does and does not
own supplemental insurance-relevant studies were conducted by
Long, Settle, and Link (1982); Cafferata (1984); Rice and McCall
(1985); Garfinkel and Corder (1985); Christensen, Long, and Rodgers
(1987); Short and Monheit (1987); and Monheit and Schur (1989).
Although a few specific findings differed, most found that the charac-
teristics associated with owning supplemental insurance included:
being among the younger aged; being white, married, employed, and
more highly educated; having a higher income; and reporting a higher
self-assessed health status.
The finding with regard to health status is of particular impor-
tance. It indicates that, at least in the aggregate, there is no evidence
that people who think they are sicker tend to purchase policies because
they expect to be using the benefits. Further, it shows that those who
consider themselves to be most in need of additional coverage are least
likely to have it. The poor and near poor are least likely to have any
form of supplementation, whether it be Medicaid or private insurance
(Long, Settle, and Link 1982; Rice and McCall 1985). In addition,
those with lower income are least likely to have their premiums subsi-
dized by a current or previous employer (Short and Monheit 1987).
Much less is known about the characteristics of individuals who
possess different types of coverage. The main information we have is
from the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, which was con-
ducted in 1977. Although the study did not control, through regression
analysis, for various determinants of ownership, some clear trends did
emerge. In general, policy owners with higher incomes and better
education were more likely to have coverage for physician office visits,
prescription drugs, and hospital stays exceeding 150 days. Part of the
reason was that policies having these provisions cost more, and there-
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fore were more likely to be purchased by those with higher incomes
(Cafferata 1984).
In this article, we expand on this line of research to examine the
"effectiveness" of supplemental health insurance choices made by dif-
ferent groups of Medicare beneficiaries. By this term, we mean
whether beneficiaries appear to be buying policies that are most likely
to pay for needed services not covered by Medicare.
DATA SOURCES
The data used for this study came from a random survey of 2,456
Medicare beneficiaries in six states (California, Florida, Mississippi,
New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin), conducted in 1982 for the
Health Care Financing Administration. The sample was limited to
elderly individuals who lived in the community, had both Part A and
Part B of Medicare, and who were not dually eligible for Medicaid.
Details on the survey and a description of respondents appear in a
previous article (Rice and McCall 1985).
As part of the study, we attempted to collect copies of all insurance
policies owned by the respondents who said they currently owned sup-
plemental insurance. Policies were obtained by mailing authorization
forms signed by beneficiaries to the insurance companies or employers.
We were able to obtain 52 percent of the policies: 84 percent of owners
signed the authorization forms, and 62 percent of policies requested
from insurance companies or employers were coded (84% x 62% =
52%). However, if an individual owned several policies, we did not
necessarily receive a copy of every policy. Of the 1,646 individuals in
the sample who owned policies, we obtained copies of every policy
identified for 740 persons (45 percent). We discuss the missing-data
problem further on.
Data elements obtained from the survey included demographic,
income, and health status variables, a score indicating the person's
knowledge of Medicare, whether or not the person said he or she
owned a supplemental insurance policy, and the number of policies
owned. Furthermore, for each policy owned, we obtained information
from the person on policy type (e.g., Medigap, hospital indemnity,
etc.) and whether or not it was originally provided through an
employer. Data coded from the policies consisted of over 100 elements,
including types of services covered and settings in which they were
covered.
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METHODOLOGY
MODEL
The theoretical model we used in selecting our independent variables
was developed by Phelps (1973). In the Phelps model, a person was
assumed to be a utility maximizer if he/she chose to purchase optimal
levels of medical care and other goods subject to a budget constraint.
Since the ownership of health insurance lowers the unit price of medi-
cal care, the optimal amount of medical care purchased would depend
on whether or not a person owned insurance, as well as on the compre-
hensiveness of the policy owned.
The factors expected to influence the decision to purchase insur-
ance were prices, income, health status, and tastes. In particular, a
person's demand for medical insurance should depend on (1) the price
of the policy and the policy's characteristics, (2) the value of the per-
son's time, (3) income, (4) anticipated health status during the time the
policy is in effect, and (5) personal tastes and preferences.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
We examined four different measures of policy ownership: (1) whether
or not a person owned at least one Medicare supplemental insurance
policy; (2) if a person owned more than one Medicare supplemental
insurance policy; (3) whether a person owned or did not own at least
one Medicare supplemental insurance policy that we define as "effec-
tive"; and (4) if a person owned a Medicare supplemental insurance
policy defined as "less effective," but did not own an "effective" policy.
We were particularly interested in differences in the factors affecting
ownership when alternative definitions were used. It is sometimes
claimed, for example, that the least knowledgeable, most vulnerable
individuals purchase multiple policies (House of Representatives
1978). Furthermore, one might anticipate that those who had achieved
the highest income and education levels would be most likely to pur-
chase effective policies.
Data for the first two variables- owning a policy and owning
more than one policy -were obtained for all sample members (N =
2,420) directly from their responses to our questions about the number
of supplemental insurance policies they owned. Information from cop-
ies of the actual policies owned was used to construct the other two
variables. Thus, to determine whether a respondent owned any policy
that was considered "effective," we needed copies of all policies owned
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by that respondent. Respondents for whom we did not receive com-
plete policy information (N = 904) were excluded when the dependent
variables dealt with the type of policy owned.2
The sample for the last two variables was therefore made up of
those who did not own a policy (N = 776) plus those for whom we were
able to obtain copies of all policies owned (N = 740). Because only
owners for whom we did not obtain a policy were excluded from the
sample, the resulting sample overweighted nonowners. As discussed
later, we reweighted the sample to adjust for this problem.
DEFINITION OF "EFFECTIVE" POLICIES
One of the primary objectives of this study was to determine the types
of individuals who, in 1982, appeared to have chosen policies that were
most likely to provide coverage for the gaps in Medicare. We define as
minimally adequate supplementation a policy that provided benefits
for a variety of illnesses and contributed toward the cost of services
provided in both inpatient and outpatient settings.3 By using this defi-
nition, which we admit to be subjective (although not particularly
stringent), we are stating that the following policies were judged to be
"less effective": Medigap and major medical policies that provided cov-
erage only for services provided in a hospital, hospital indemnity poli-
cies, and "dread disease" policies. It is worth noting that the typical
hospital indemnity policy owned by our sample members paid only $30
per day. In a recent GAO report, it was also concluded that hospital
indemnity and specified-disease policies were of limited value (United
States General Accounting Office 1988).
Nevertheless, consumers who purchased the types of policies
judged to be "less effective" may in fact have been acting rationally,
particularly if such persons knew that their likely hospitalization expe-
rience would justify the purchase decision. What our methodology
implies is that persons who did not own any policies judged to be
"effective" lacked the coverage necessary to help defray the costs of
illnesses they were most likely to incur. For example, Christensen,
Long, and Rodgers (1987) found that, on average, a person without a
Medigap policy would pay more than $1,300 a year out-of-pocket in
hospital and physician charges alone if he or she were hospitalized once
during that year. If that person Qwned a hospital indemnity policy that
paid $50 per day and the stay lasted eight days, the insurance would
pay only $400 of the $1,300.
229
230 HSR: Health Services Research 26:2 (June 1991)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The earlier discussion indicates that it would be desirable to have
measures of several types of variables in our models of ownership: the
price of the policy and the policy's characteristics, the value of the
person's time, the person's income, anticipated health status during the
time the policy is in effect, and personal tastes and preferences. One of
these items, the policy's characteristics, is already accounted for
because we define our dependent variables according to the particular
characteristics of policies owned (i.e., whether we judge their benefits
to be "effective" or not in limiting high out-of-pocket costs). Our mea-
sures for each of the other items are discussed below.
Policy Prices
It was difficult to obtain a direct measure of policy prices for a number
of reasons. First, we wanted a measure not only of the prices paid by
owners of insurance, but also of the prices faced by those who decided
not to purchase policies. Second, for owners we wished to measure not
only the price of the policy purchased, but also the prices of alterna-
tives. Finally, even if these problems could be solved, it would have
been difficult to operationalize the measures because policy prices tend
to be the same within a geographic area, thus resulting in a high degree
of correlation between the sample members.
Instead of measuring the price of insurance, we used two proxy
measures that indicated whether a sample member was likely to receive
a subsidy toward the purchase of supplemental insurance. The mea-
sures were: (1) whether the person or spouse currently was working 20
or more hours a week for pay (a dummy variable), and (2) whether the
person's occupation before retirement was of the type that typically
provides subsidized retiree health insurance. In our model, two vari-
ables captured whether or not a person had ajob that typically provides
retiree health benefits: a dummy variable indicating that the occupa-
tion was not of that type, and another indicating that the sample
member was a housewife. The comparison group category was
whether or not the person had a job that was most likely to provide
health insurance.4
Value of Time
The data set had no direct measures of the value of the sample mem-
ber's time, but several variables in the model may have captured this to
some degree: income, education, and whether the individual or spouse
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was currently working for pay. Each, however, was an imperfect proxy
and was included in the model to capture other determinants of
ownership.
Income
Two sets of variables were designed to capture the effects of income.
The first was a set of two dummy variables for income: whether the
person's family income was between $5,000 and $9,999, and whether it
was $10,000 or more. The omitted category was people with incomes
below $5,000. The second type of variable representing income was
also a dummy, indicating that the person owned property (usually a
house).
Health Status
The survey instrument included a measure of self-assessed health sta-
tus. We formed two dummy variables from it: whether the person rated
his or her health as "fair," or whether he or she rated it as "poor." The
omitted category was a rating of "good or excellent."
Demographics/Tastes
We also had measures of several demographic characteristics that
might indicate preferences for health insurance. These included two
dummy variables for age, two for education, and one each for race,
sex, marital status, and urbanization level. Our final variable was a
continuous measure of the respondent's knowledge of Medicare: the




Each sample member in the study was given a survey weight indicating
the number of people this member represented in his or her state.
Because our survey included approximately the same number of indi-
viduals from each of the six states, weights varied substantially by
state. A sample member in California or Florida, for example, would
have a much larger weight than one from Mississippi, because our
survey included a much larger percentage of the elderly population in
the latter.
We pooled data from the six states to increase our sample size and
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to make the regression results more manageable. However, if we were
to use the raw survey weights, the results from two states, California
and Florida, would dominate the results. To avoid this situation, we
adjusted the weights so that the sum of all individuals' weights in each
state was equal. In other words, each state was given equal weight.
Adjusting Weights for Nonreceipt of Policy
For the models where the dependent variables were constructed using
information from the actual policies owned (i.e., effective, less effec-
tive), we excluded sample members for whom we could not obtain
complete policy information. It was then necessary to reweight the
subgroup for which we received copies of all policies owned, so that
they could be considered representative of the sample of owners as a
whole. Using the information provided by the respondents, policies
were categorized across two dimensions: Medigap versus non-
Medigap and employer group versus non-employer group.
Because it was possible to own more than one policy, for each
respondent we examined the survey response to determine whether he
or she owned a policy that was Medigap, a policy that was non-
Medigap, a policy obtained through an employer group, or a policy
not obtained through an employer group. This process resulted in
assignment of each respondent to one of several ownership categories.
For example, one category was those who reported owning only Medi-
gap employer group policies; another category was those who reported
owning only Medigap non-employer group, and so on, with the final
category being those who reported owning Medigap policies, non-
Medigap policies, employer group policies, and non-employer group
policies.
The next step was to make the distribution across the categories
the same for the subgroup for which we obtained all policies (N = 740)
as it was for all owners (N = 1,644). For each category, we calculated a
scalar equal to the percent of all owners in that category divided by the
percent of the respondents in that same category for which we obtained
all policies. The weight for each person in the subgroup for which we
received all policies was then adjusted by multiplying it by the corres-
ponding scalar.
STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES
Because our dependent variables were dichotomous, we used logit
analysis to estimate the models. However, the original survey data
were derived from a complex sample design. Consequently, the esti-
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mated standard errors would be biased unless these "design effects"
were corrected. We used a statistical software package, RTILOGIT
(Shah, Folsom, Harrell, et al. 1984), to correct standard errors for
these effects.
FINDINGS
Before discussing the findings, the limitations of the data should be
described. Medicaid beneficiaries were not included in the data base.
Thus, these findings can only be generalized to the non-Medicaid
Medicare population. Persons for whom we did not obtain copies of
policies were excluded from the sample for some analyses. As discussed
earlier, we reweighted the sample to mirror the entire sample in terms
of any ownership and self-reported type of policy owned. Finally, the
findings, strictly speaking, apply only to the six sampled states. How-
ever, these states do represent a range of national regions and income
levels.
NUMBER OF POLICIES OWNED
Table 1 shows the results of the logit analyses for the first dependent
variable: the factors determining whether a person owns one or more
policies. The "percent change" column in Table 1 shows how much
each of the independent variables affects the probability of ownership,
measured against the baseline individual and controlling for all other
factors.6
Several factors are shown to be statistically significant determi-
nants of ownership. Each of the price variables is significant and has
the expected sign. Those who were currently working or had a spouse
working were more likely to own supplemental insurance. In addition,
sample members who previously had occupations defined as "less likely
to provide insurance" or who were housewives did in fact have lower
ownership rates. This is probably because those who did not work in
jobs that tended to provide health insurance were less likely to receive
subsidized supplemental health insurance coverage on retirement.
Each of the income variables is also statistically significant and has
the expected sign. In fact, the variable for family income of $10,000 or
more has the second-highest effect on ownership. Controlling for other
factors, those with higher income and those who owned property were
much more likely to own supplemental insurance.
One of the health status variables, poor health, is also statistically
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Table 1: Logit Results -Owns One or More Policies
Standard Percent
Independent Variable Mean Coefficient Error Changet
Price of Insurance
Person or spouse works
20 hours/week (or more)
Type of occupation before
retirement
More likely to provide
insurance
























































significant. The results show that, for the baseline persons, those
reporting their health status as "poor" had ownership rates 10.5 percent
lower than people who rated their health as "good" or "excellent." This
result reinforces previous research, which indicates that even when
income is controlled for, those in poor health are less likely to purchase
supplemental insurance.
With respect to the demographic variables, one result consistent
with previous studies is that nonwhites were much less likely to own
supplemental insurance. In fact, this was the most important variable
in the model. Among the baseline persons, nonwhites were 30.4 per-
















Medicare Suppkmental Health Insurance
Table 1: Continued
Education
Less than 12 years 0.521 -t -t -$
High school graduate 0.249 0.037 .137 0.8
Some college 0.230 0.113 .161 2.5
Married 0.573 -0.125 .127 -2.9
Lives in SMSA 0.591 -0.167 .112 -3.9
Knowledge of Medicare 3.298 0.216*** .036 1.6
Intercept -0.117
F-value 16.150***
Mean of dependent variable 0.781
Sample size 2,420
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
**'Significant at 1 percent level.
tFor the dichotomous independent variables, this column shows the effect on the
dependent variable of a change in each independent variable from a value of 0 to a
value of 1, holding all other variables at their baseline values: male, age 65-69,
white, unmarried, no high school diploma, income less than $5,000 a year, not a
property owner, in good or excellent health, worked in an occupation likely to have
provided health insurance, does not work or have a spouse currently working 20
hours a week, and has an average level of Medicare knowledge. For the one
continuous variable in the model, knowledge of Medicare, this column indicates
how the probability of the dependent variable changes when knowledge increases
from its mean value to 10 percent above the mean.
$Reference group.
women were more likely to own policies than men, even controlling for
marital status. Age, education, marital status, and the urbanization
level of residence were not statistically significant determinants of
ownership.
Finally, a positive association exists between knowledge of
Medicare and ownership of a policy. More knowledgeable individuals
were more likely to be owners: for every 10 percent increase in knowl-
edge, for the baseline person the probability of ownership rose by 1.6
percent. This finding may indicate that those who are most informed
about Medicare's coverages and gaps are the most likely to feel the need
to purchase supplemental insurance.
Table 2 examines the factors that influence whether a person owns
more than one policy. One might expect better-educated, more knowl-
edgeable individuals to shy away from multiple policies because they
would perceive their purchase to be unnecessary. The first point to be
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Table 2: Logit Results -Owns Two or More Policies
Standard Percent
Independent Variable Mean Coefficient Error Changet
Price of Insurance
Person or spouse works
20 hours/week (or more)
Type of occupation before
retirement
More likely to provide
insurance








































































made about these results is that multiple-policy ownership is not very
common. Whereas 78 percent of sample members owned one policy,
only 21 percent owned more than one. With regard to the determi-
nants of multiple-policy ownership, few trends are apparent. There is
no relationship between this dependent variable and health status, age,
or income, although property owners were more likely to own more
than one policy. Some results are statistically significant, however.
Those who worked or had a working spouse were more likely to own
multiple policies, probably because they received one policy through
their job and felt the need for additional supplementation. Nonwhites
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Table 2: Continued
Education
Less than 12 years 0.521 -$ -t -t
High school graduate 0.249 0.237 .132 3.3
Some college 0.230 0.448*** .137 6.6
Married 0.573 -0.389*** .120 -4.3
Lives in SMSA 0.591 -0.498*** .105 -5.3
Knowledge of Medicare 3.298 0.161 .401 0.7
Intercept -2.276* * *
F-value 5.12***
Mean of dependent variable 0.207
Sample size 2,420
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
tFor the dichotomous independent variables, this column shows the effect on the
dependent variable of a change in each independent variable from a value of 0 to a
value of 1, holding all other variables at their baseline values: male, age 65-69,
white, unmarried, no high school diploma, income less than $5,000 a year, not a
property owner, in good or excellent health, worked in an occupation likely to have
provided health insurance, does not work or have a spouse currently working 20
hours a week, and has an average level of Medicare knowledge. For the one
continuous variable in the model, knowledge of Medicare, this column indicates
how the probability of the dependent variable changes when knowledge increases
from its mean value to 10 percent above the mean.
tReference group.
were less likely to own more than one policy, just as they were less likely
to own any supplemental insurance policy.
Three surprising results are that sample members in urban areas
were less likely to own more than one policy, that married individuals
were also less likely to, and that those who had completed some college
were more likely to own multiple policies. Perhaps the nonmarried
were more likely to purchase multiple policies because they felt more
vulnerable to the cost consequences of catastrophic medical problems.
The finding concerning education is not intuitive. Although one might
expect the best-educated individuals to purchase only one policy, this
was not the case. The reason for more multiple ownership in nonurban
areas also is not obvious, but could be related to the commonly held
belief that the marketing of specific-disease and indemnity policies is
more common in rural areas because of the relative lack of sophistica-
tion of the potential buyers.
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One can draw some tentative conclusions in comparing the two
sets of results presented in Tables 1 and 2. So-called enabling factors-
occupation, income, race, and knowledge-are all determinants of
whether a person owns a policy. In general, those who are better off
tend to own policies. But the results for multiple ownership are harder
to explain. There still is a relationship between some higher socioeco-
nomic status variables (specifically, property ownership and education)
and multiple ownership, but fewer of the variables that represent a
higher socioeconomic level are significant. Furthermore, other impor-
tant relationships emerge that did not show up in the first model: that
married individuals and those living in urban areas, for example, are
less likely to own more than one policy. The fact that there are rela-
tively few statistically significant coefficients and that these results are
harder to generalize from probably indicates that the full story con-
cerning multiple-policy ownership is not yet understood. However, the
socioeconomic results make it difficult to conclude definitively that the
most disadvantaged people are the most likely to be "duped" into buy-
ing more than one supplemental insurance policy.
TYPE OF POLICY OWNED
Tables 3 and 4 show the remaining logit findings. Table 3 presents
results for the factors affecting whether a person owns one or more
policies judged to be "effective," and Table 4 presents them for the
determinants of owning one or more "less effective" policies but having
no "effective" ones. Before presenting these findings, it is important to
reiterate how we defined "effective." Policies were judged to be "less
effective" if they provided coverage only for services in the hospital, or
if they provided only indemnity coverage or coverage for a particular
disease. Although this definition ignores many of the intricacies of
what constitutes good insurance coverage, it does classify policies
according to their likelihood of providing at least some chance of ade-
quate supplementation to Medicare if a cosdy illness is incurred.
The results for the model in Table 3, whether a person owns at
least one "effective" policy, are almost identical to the model presented
in Table 1, where we look simply at the factors affecting ownership. In
general, the same socioeconomic indicators improve the probability of
ownership: occupation, higher income, better health, being white, and
having a better understanding of Medicare. The major difference is
that education is also statistically significant: those who completed high
school or college were more likely to have purchased one or more
"effective" policies. This relationship did not appear when we looked at
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Table 3: Logit Results -Owns One or More "Effective"
Policies
Standard Percent
Independent Variable Mean Coefficient Error Changet
Price of Insurance
Person or spouse works
20 hours/week (or more)
Type of occupation before
retirement
More likely to provide
insurance
























































ownership in the earlier model. In addition, whereas females were
much more likely than males to own any type of policy, this coefficient
is no longer significant when we examine policies judged to be
"effective."
In comparison, the factors that affect whether a person owns one
or more "less effective" policies but no "effective" ones are much differ-
ent (Table 4). There are very few significant results, and some of those
that do appear are in the opposite direction. Nonwhites were still less
likely to own "less effective" policies. However, older beneficiaries had
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Table 3: Continued
Education
Less than 12 years 0.528 -t -t -
High school graduate 0.254 0.439*** .146 8.4
Some college 0.218 0.397* .161 7.5
Married 0.554 -0.037 .139 -0.6
Lives in SMSA 0.597 0.129 .122 2.3
Knowledge of Medicare 3.152 0.132*** .040 0.7
Intercept -1.683***
F-value 9.020***
Mean of dependent variable 0.451
Sample size 1,516
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
tFor the dichotomous independent variables, this column shows the effect on the
dependent variable of a change in each independent variable from a value of 0 to a
value of 1, holding all other variables at their baseline values: male, age 65-69,
white, unmarried, no high school diploma, income less than $5,000 a year, not a
property owner, in good or excellent health, worked in an occupation likely to have
provided health insurance, does not work or have a spouse currently working 20
hours a week, and has an average level of Medicare knowledge. For the one
continuous variable in the model, knowledge of Medicare, this column indicates
how the probability of the dependent variable changes when knowledge increases
from its mean value to 10 percent above the mean.
tReference group.
than those age 65-69, and high school graduates (although not college
graduates) were less likely to own such a policy. There is no relation-
ship between owning "less effective" policies and occupation, income,
health status, sex, marital status, urbanization, or knowledge of
Medicare.
In comparing the two logit models in Table 3 and Table 4, we see
that those who are better off socioeconomically appear to be making
more effective choices in the supplemental health insurance market.
Whereas the better off appear to be buying more "effective" policies,
there is no such pattern for purchase of "less effective" policies. Rather,
older, less educated individuals are more likely to purchase the latter.
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Table 4: Logit Results-Owns One or More "Less Effective"
Policies and No "Effective" Policy
Standard Percent
Independent Variable Mean Coefficient Error Changet
Price of Insurance
Person or spouse works
20 hours/week (or more)
Type of occupation before
retirement
More likely to provide
insurance














































One of the central findings of this research- which, admittedly, was
confined to just six states- is that individuals who appear to be making
the better supplemental insurance purchase decisions tend to be those
who are better off socioeconomically. In light of the repeal of the Cata-
strophic Act, there should be concern that the less advantaged of the
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Table 4: Continued
Education
Less than 12 years 0.528 -t -t -t
High school graduate 0.254 -0.440* .191 -4.2
Some college 0.218 -0.351 .206 -3.4
Married 0.554 -0.167 .166 -1.7
Lives in SMSA 0.597 -0.219 .145 -2.2
Knowledge of Medicare 3.152 0.074 .049 0.3
Intercept -2.164***
F-value 2.430***
Mean of dependent variable 0.163
Sample size 1 ,516
*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
tFor the dichotomous independent variables, this column shows the effect on the
dependent variable of a change in each independent variable from a value of 0 to a
value of 1, holding all other variables at their baseline values: male, age 65-69,
white, unmarried, no high school diploma, income less than $5,000 a year, not a
property owner, in good or excellent health, worked in an occupation likely to have
provided health insurance, does not work or have a spouse currently working 20
hours a week, and has an average level of Medicare knowledge. For the one
continuous variable in the model, knowledge of Medicare, this column indicates
how the probability of the dependent variable changes when knowledge increases
from its mean value to 10 percent above the mean.
tReference group.
Curiously, we also found an apparent lack of relationship between
multiple policy ownership and consumer ignorance or vulnerability. It
has been reported that some individuals have purchased as many as 27
supplemental health insurance policies (Shearer 1990). From this one
might infer that the least educated beneficiaries would be most vulner-
able to marketing abuses that result in multiple policy ownership.
While this may be true in some instances, it does not appear to be the
case in the aggregate. We found that those who owned more than one
supplemental policy were more likely to be the currently working,
property owners, and the more highly educated. It is therefore difficult
to conclude that most of the elderly who purchase more than one policy
are being duped into doing so.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90)
includes a number of provisions that may help consumers choose more
Medicare Supplemental Health Insurance
effective supplemental health insurance policies. Perhaps the most
important provision is that policies will be required to include benefits
that conform to one of up to ten prototypes. The purpose of this aspect
of the legislation is to simplify the market, thus allowing consumers to
more easily compare the prices of different policies. The legislation also
raises loss ratios from 60 percent to 65 percent for individual policies,
and from 70 percent to 75 percent for group policies. Perhaps most
pertinent to this study, OBRA-90 authorizes the provision of grants to
states to help them establish consumer counseling programs relating to
the purchase of supplemental insurance.
The Medicare supplemental market historically has been plagued
with poor consumer knowledge resulting not only from a lack of infor-
mation but also from the inherent complexities of the Medicare pro-
gram (McCall, Rice, and Sangl 1986). Our study has indicated that
there is some cause for concern about whether consumers make effec-
tive choices. Consequently, an important role for public policy remains
to increase the amount of consumer information available as well as to
assure, through selective regulation, that grossly inefficient policies are
not available in the market.
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NOTES
1. Besides defining minimum benefits, the NAIC model legislation also speci-
fies prohibited policy provisions, minimum loss ratio standards (75 percent
for group policies, 60 percent for individual policies), and required formats
for outlines of coverage.
2. We conducted an analysis to determine how much the sample with incom-
plete policy information differed from those with complete codings. We
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looked at 22 variables, including income (annual income, property owner-
ship), self-assessed health status, demographic characteristics (race, sex,
age, education, marital status, and urbanization of residence), and the
groups' knowledge score on questions about Medicare. Only four variables
among the 22 variables examined were significantly different between the
two groups. Those with complete policy codings were less likely to work for
pay or to have a spouse working for pay, and had fewer people with
incomes less than $5,000 but a smaller mean property ownership. They
also were less often married than those with incomplete policy codings.
Although these differences were significant, the magnitudes of the differ-
ences in the means were small, ranging from .04 to .06. This general
similarity in demographics led us to conclude that those differences that did
exist could be controlled for by including the demographic characteristics
just mentioned as independent variables in the model estimated in this
article.
3. One could argue that the availability of coverage of services provided in
outpatient settings is even more important now than in 1982. Since the
implementation of DRGs in 1983, there has been a large shift in the
provision of services toward the outpatient setting (Fisher 1986).
4. Determination of whether a person was likely to have retiree insurance
provided through an employer was made from the Handbook ofLabor Statis-
tics (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1989). Occupations classified as most likely
to provide insurance were: professional specialty, management/
administration, transportation, manufacturing, skilled trade, and office
worker. Half of the sample had occupations that were most likely to provide
insurance. About one-fourth were in occupations less likely to provide
insurance, and the remaining one-fourth classified themselves as
housewives.
5. The six true-or-false statements are: (1) The costs of eyeglasses are covered
by Medicare; (2) Medicare pays all the bills you may have for visits to a
doctor's office; (3) Medicare does not cover the cost of prescription drugs
you buy at a pharmacy; (4) For a long hospital stay, Medicare does not
cover any expenses after 30 days; (5) Medicare covers all the costs of a six-
month stay in a nursing home; (6) Medicare covers all the costs of a five-
day hospital stay, except for a deductible of about $250. The third
statement and the last one were true at the time of the survey; the other
statements were false.
6. For example, in the first logit model the percent change of 13.2 means that
white unmarried males age 65-69 who were not property owners, who
were in good or excellent health, who worked in an occupation likely to
provide health insurance, and who had an average level of Medicare
knowledge, were 13.2 percent more likely to own a policy if they or their
spouse worked 20 or more hours per week, than if neither the sample
member nor his/her spouse worked. Thus, if such a person had a 50
percent probability of ownership, varying this one factor would increase
the probability of ownership to 63.2 percent.
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